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Introduction *
It should be recognised at the outset that the context of
socialist agriculture within which this contribution is
located is itself an ambiguous matter in the Tanzanian
case. This ambiguity originates in part from a shift in
the emphasis of state policy from encouragement of
the voluntary adoption of communal production by
peasants themselves, as proposed in the original
concept of ujamaa, to the compulsory nuclear
villagisation of the rural population which took place
in the mid-1970s. The central issue of debate has been
whether the drive towards increased state intervention
in the Tanzanian peasant economy, manifested also in
other policies of the 1970s, can usefully be considered
synonymous with the promotion of socialism in
agricultural production. Opinions on this question
divide between those [eg Hyden 19801 who regard the
incorporation of the peasant economy into the ambit
of the modernising state as a prerequisite for the
transformation of production relations in agriculture,
and those who view the increasing bureaucratisation
of peasant-state relations as the very antithesis of a
transition to participatory socialism.'
There are several notes of explanation required about
the content of the discussion which follows. The first is
that many of the arguments and evidence put forward
represent a highly condensed summary of material set
out in much greater detail in two separate papers [Ellis
1982a; forthcoming]. The second is that there exists a
wide gap in the interpretation of the Tanzanian
experience between those, including myself, who view
the state as a significant economic entity in its own
right, the behavioural characteristics and growth of
which is a legitimate object of enquiry independent of
the declared objectives of government leaders, and
those who view the state simply as the neutral vehicle
for the implementation of declared policies.2 The third
* J am grateful to Reg Green and Manfred Bienefeld for
extensive comments on the draft of this paper. The
interpretation it contains of the Tanzanian experience is of
course entirely my own.
'There are numerous potential difficulties in the definition of what
might be regarded as a transition to socialist agricultural production
in the Tanzanian context. The working definition implied here
would require the increasing adoption, by peasants themselves, of
communal production with grass-roots participation in decision-
making (je joint ownership and control of the means of production
and participatory determination of what to produce and of the
distribution of income generated from production).
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is that the discussion focuses mainly on the period
between 1970 and 1980. It does not therefore contain
any conjectural hypotheses about the likely success or
failure of policy changes put into effect since 1980.
It is proposed here to examine the relationship of
agricultural price policy to the unfolding of events in
Tanzanian agricultural production, located in the
wider context of peasant-state relationships during the
1970s. Perhaps not surprisingly, the debates con-
cerning socialist agriculture in Tanzania tend to be
distinguished more by the absence of any coherent
ideas about the appropriate role of agricultural price
policy than by the adoption of a logically consistent
position. Leaving aside the many contributions which
make no mention of agricultural prices at all, it is
possible to distinguish four major propositions which
appear implicitly or explicitly in the literature:
that agricultural prices have no active role in the
promotion of socialism, since price incentives
encourage individualism amongst peasants and class
differentiation in the rural economy [implicit in
Nyerere 1967 and also in a host of commentaries on
ujamaa written in the early 1970s];
that peasant farmers are unresponsive to price
and that therefore price levels have no significant role
in achieving a greater marketed surplus from the rural
economy: thus it is legitimate for the state to seek more
direct methods to achieve that aim [explicit in Hyden
1980];
that the only significant role for agricultural
prices in a transition to socialism is to transfer a
financial surplus out of the rural economy in order to
promote capital accumulation and industrialisation
[explicit in Thomas 1974];
that peasant farmers are sensitive to price, with
the consequence that holding down agricultural prices
2 At least part of this gap appears to originate in differences in the
definition of the state. The former view demands a wide definition
which encompasses the rapid expansion of the state into activities,
like crop marketing, previously undertaken by non-state agents [see
Ellis forthcoming], while the latter view restricts the definition to the
narrow area of 'public administration'. It is for this reason that the
latter view is unable to comprehend the notion of peasants being
squeezed to support a parasitic bureaucracy, a proposition which is
readily substantiated if state agricultural marketing institutions are
included within the state apparatus as a whole (see further below).
creates a 'scissors crisis' for the state in which ever
more coercive measures are required to extract a
marketed surplus from the rural economy [explicit in
Coulson 1975; Boesen 19791.
The empirical analysis of agricultural prices (to which
I return in due course) would suggest that the first
three of these propositions singly or in combination
effectively predominated in the state approach to
pricing policy in the period between 1967 and 1974,
official pronouncements to the contrary notwith-
standing. Between 1974 and 1980 there was a partial
change of emphasis which resulted in significant real
increases in food crop prices while appropriate price
levels for export crops continued to be relatively
neglected. In the present context interest centres on the
fourth proposition. This both contradicts the
preceding three as to the role of prices as an incentive
to production and also contains a potential
explanation of the process by which the Tanzanian
state came to adopt an even more autocratic stance
towards the peasantry during the 1970s.
In order to place these propositions about agricultural
prices in perspective it is necessary to digress briefly
and recap on the major initiatives taken by the
Tanzanian state towards agricultural production. In
what follows attention is directed first to the
significance of peasant agriculture within the
Tanzanian economy, secondly to the evolution of the
state approach to peasant production, thirdly to the
results of empirical analysis on price policy
implementation, and fourthly to the lessons which can
be drawn from the Tanzanian experience.
Peasant Agriculture in the Tanzanian Economy
Tanzania remains today predominantly a country of
small-scale peasant agriculturalists. In the two
decades since Independence was gained from Britain
in 1961 the proportion of the country's population
living in the rural economy has declined only
gradually from 97 per cent to 85 per cent. Since the
overall population growth rate was 3.3 per cent over
this period, the absolute number of people living in
rural areas has increased from ID mn to 16 mn.
Unlike some of its neighbours, Tanzania experienced
only relatively minor growth of settler-based com-
mercial agricultural during the colonial period. One
implication of this is that the production of export
crops such as coffee, cashew nuts, and cotton arose
within peasant agriculture and did not involve the
extensive alienation of land from smaliholders.
Another is that the production of food staples both
for subsistence consumption and for marketed surplus
- is almost wholly based on the peasant economy.
Historically and contemporarily the only crops for
which large-scale commercial production has been
significant are sisal (now produced mainly on state
plantations, and of declining importance), tea (for
which there is one major foreign-owned plantation
and an increasing participation by smallholders), and
wheat (now produced mainly on state farms).
The foregoing is sufficient to explain the priority
which has been attached to peasant agricultural
production in Tanzania throughout the post-
Independence period. In effect peasant agriculture
constitutes the core productive base of the economy.
The output performance of peasant agriculture
determines both the degree of national self-sufficiency
in food and, via peasant-produced export crops, the
capacity of the economy to import. By extension, any
development strategy not solidly based on improving
the productivity and prosperity of the peasant
economy would appear to invite failure at the outset.
As is amply demonstrated by the current Tanzanian
crisis, the pursuit of misconceived policies towards
peasant agriculture renders the entire economic
structure liable to imminent collapse. However, this is
to jump a step ahead. The policies which have been
followed first require brief elaboration.
Ujamaa, Villagisation, and Beyond
Hyden [1980] is probably correct in asserting that
most of the policy initiatives of the Tanzanian state in
the agricultural sphere have been consciously or
unconsciously designed to draw the peasants more
effectively under central state control. The conclusions
he draws from this are another matter, to which I
return shortly.
Ujamaa began its life as a voluntaristic concept in
which peasants would be encouraged to realise the
potential benefits of living and working together in
villages [Nyerere 1966; 1968]. The emphasis in the
earlier years after its official adoption were on
communal production, self-help at the village level,
and popular participation. The subsequent evolution
of the policy towards compulsory villagisation has
been described in detail elsewhere [Coulson 1977]. For
present purposes it is sufficient to record that in late
1973 a decision was reached to move the entire rural
population into nuclear villages over the following
two years. At the same time the emphasis of the policy
shifted away from communal production towards
administrative expediency and access to services
(roads, water supply, schools etc).
The contemporary administrative structure of the
Tanzanian rural economy is one in which the entire
peasant population is distributed between 8,299
designated villages. The majority of these are nuclear
villages created or expanded during the villagisation
campaign, in which between 250 and 600 (ranging in
some cases to over 1,000) families are clustered
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together at one location.3 A minority, confined mainly
to coffee growing areas, are simply area divisions
superimposed on the pre-existing spatial distribution
of peasant farmers. The minimum village size of 250
families, as also other minimum requirements for
villages to achieve formal registration and thence
qualify for government development projects, is
enshrined in a Villages Act of l975.
The village framework recognises three main forms of
agricultural production: the traditional smaliholding;
the allocated family smallholding on the village block
farm; and the communal farm. The difference between
the first two lies only in the way in which access to land
is determined, not in any change in the organisation of
the production process. The mass relocation of
previously scattered peasant families self-evidently
required a minimum obligation of land distribution to
those moved, and the village block farm provided a
suitable vehicle to meet this obligation.
Communal production has arisen very unevenly
within the village framework and is associated at least
in part with the more favoured (by the state) formal
status conferred on villages which can show some
commitment to communal enterprise.5 A nationwide
survey of 514 villages conducted in 1979 [United
Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister's Office 1980]
found that 72 per cent of villages operated a
communal farm, but this average conceals a wide
regional variation from under 30 per cent in some
regions to 100 per cent in others. Moreoever 25 per cent
of those villages which stated that they had a
communal farm were unable to provide any evidence
as to their area under cultivation or their output. A
more detailed survey of 30 villages in Ruvuma, Mbeya,
and Iringa regions in southern Tanzania [Tibaijuka
1980] revealed an average communal farm size in 20
villages of 97 acres with a standard deviation of Ill
acres (the size of communal farms ranged erratically
between 3 and 400 acres).
The extent to which the villagisation campaign created new
settlements where none had previously existed has possibly been
exaggerated in some writings on this topic. This is partly due to the
neglect of the so-called 'Defence Villages' which were created in the
Mtwara and Ruvuma Regions in the late l960s. The striking feature
of the 1974 campaign was not so much the number of the new
villages created but rather the very substantial increase in the
average size of villages. Thus between March 1974 and December
1975, the number of officially recognised villages increased only
from 5,008 to 6,944 while their average population grew from 511 to
1,260.
The full title of the 1975 village legislation is The Villages and
Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration)
Act passed in July 1975. This Act was later amended in April 1979 to
allow village governments to raise revenues, to make village bye-
laws, and to. fine village members who failed to comply with such
bye-laws.
The 1975 Village Act recognises three different levels of village
status: unregistered, registered, and ujamaa. In order to qualify for
the latter it is necessary to demonstrate a proven commitment to
communal enterprise.
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These and other partial surveys show that the
individual family srnallholding has remained after
villagisation by far the majority form of agricultural
production. While no precise national figure is directly
available, the evidence would suggest that communal
production accounts for no more than eight per cent of
the total land under village crop production.6
Moreover it cannot be assumed from such evidence
that communal production is on an upward trend. On
the contrary, the same surveys indicate that communal
enterprises have been beset with administrative and
financial difficulties which may have had a widespread
negative impact on peasant motivation to further their
participation in such activity.
In the absence of the further adoption of communal
production, the nuclear village potentially creates
severely adverse conditions for the future productivity
of peasant agriculture in Tanzania. This is because the
distance factor from village centres demands per-
manent cultivation where previous peasant agronomic
practices were based on bush rotations and shifting
cultivation. In addition, the minimum village size of
250 families adopted during the villagisation campaign
meant both that the average village size is considerably
in excess of that figure (actually 347 families in 1979)
and that population growth imposes increasingly
severe demands on land use. Alarmed agronomists
have already begun to speak of village 'deserts' created
by over-intensive cultivation, deforestation (mainly
for firewood), and serious soil erosion, within a
walking-distance radius of each village.
The Tanzanian state has extended its direct
intervention in matters affecting the peasant economy
in a number of ways apart from villagisation. Some of
these are of direct relevance to the way in which
agricultural producer prices enter the picture, as can
be noted from the following far from exhausting
synopsis:
in 1972 a decentralisat ion of the state apparatus
was put into effect which created a pyramidal
hierarchy of administration from the central to the
regional, district, ward, and village levels;
in 1976 the state dissolved agricultural marketing
cooperatives and replaced them by parastatal crop
authorities as the sole purchasing agents for crops
restricted to sale through official channels;
between 1973 and 1976 the state changed the basis
of agricultural price policy from its previous
implementation at the level of sales by the
6i figure is highly approximate and may well exaggerate the
significance of communal production. It is obtained simply by
multiplying up a notional average communal farm size of 90 acres
by the total number of villages and expressing the result as a
percentage of the total estimated acreage under village crop
cultivation (9.6 mn acres).
cooperatives to the determination centrally of uniform
pan-territorial producer prices for all scheduled crops
sold by the peasantry. At the same time, the coverage
of agricultural price policy was extended so that by
1978 virtually the only category of crops excluded
from official marketing channels, and hence legally
open to commercial purchase by non-state agents, was
fresh fruit and vegetables;
during the 1970s the state took over control of the
wholesale and distribution system of consumer goods
outside major towns through the creation of
parastatal Regional Trading Companies (RTCs);
an attempt was made in 1977 to abolish private
retailing in the rural economy. The incidence of severe
shortages of consumer goods in villages following this
decision led to its temporary suspension. However the
intention was revived in 1980 when it was declared that
all villages should have communal shops and that
RTCs would be the sole distribution agents to such
shops;
the legislative framework of villages was deployed
by the state after 1974 to revive various colonial bye-
laws designed to enforce peasant compliance with
state production directives. These included minimum-
acreage laws, fines for failure to follow cultivation
practices laid down by state extension officers, fines
for the uprooting or destruction of perennial tree
crops, and restrictions on personal movement prior to
official inspection of plots.
Most of these developments (including villagisation
itself) are susceptible to at least two interpretations,
bringing us back to the ambiguity with which we
started. On the one hand it might be argued that they
represent strenuous efforts on the part of the state to
force the pace of transition to socialism via the
establishment of participatory mechanisms down to
the level of the individual peasant and the elimination
of the market as a form of economic interaction. On
the other hand, they can be interpreted as increasingly
desperate attempts by an unproductive bureaucracy to
wrest itself a place in the productive base of the
economy via the subjugation of the peasantry. Hyden
[19801 wavers between the two views, and, to the
extent that he recognises some merit in the second,
appears to applaud it as the only means by which a
recalcitrant peasantry can be forced into the modern
age.
Agricultural Price Policy
The concrete record of agricultural price policy
implementation in Tanzania is highly relevant to the
assessment of these different interpretations of the
Tanzanian experience. This is because the conditions
of existence in the typical peasant economy are quite
precarious enough (and thus anyway dictate caution
towards innovation) without the added imposition of
persistent declining returns on external crop sales. It is
certainly difficult to see how communal production
could be made to appear to the peasantry as a superior
alternative if the real producer prices of marketed
agricultural crops were declining in precisely those
years of first experimentation in communal agriculture.
The observations which follow are drawn from a more
detailed analysis of agricultural price and marketing
policy in Tanzania [Ellis 1982a; forthcoming]. In
interpreting these results it should be noted, first, that
the coverage of the analysis is most peasant crops
confined by Tanzanian legislation to sale through
state channels; secondly, that percentage changes in
weighted average price levels are expressed in real
terms je after adjustment for inflation; and thirdly,
that the period of observation (1970-80) spans the
complete transition from voluntary ujamaa through
villagisation and post-villagisation. Where reference is
made to specific categories of crops these are
distinguished by their strategic role in the national
economy - hence export crops are sold in external
markets and are the major source of foreign exchange
earnings; domestic crops are mainly for internal
consumption and include staple grains (maize, rice,
and wheat) and drought crops (previous subsistence or
minor crops encouraged for commercial sale in the
l970s to meet national food security objectives).
Agricultural producer prices declined on average
by 40 per cent between 1970 and 1975, after which they
increased moderately by 7 per cent between 1975 and
1980. In 1980 prices were still 36 per cent below their
1970 level in real terms;
this decline was distributed unevenly between
different categories of crops, such that over the whole
decade export crop prices decreased by 43 per cent,
staple grains prices decreased by 21 per cent, and
drought crop prices rose by four per cent. For staple
grains there was a sharp reversal of price policy in
mid-decade so that a decline of 32 per cent between
1970 and 1974 was followed by a steep rise up to 1977.
However, the effects of this rise were rapidly eroded by
an acceleration of domestic inflation from 1978
onwards;
trends in the composition of peasant marketed
output suggest a high degree of sensitivity to changes
in relative price levels between crops, especially when
such shifts are sustained over several crops seasons.
Taking three-year averages at the beginning and end
of the decade, peasant export crop sales declined by
20 per cent, staple gains sales increased by 34 per cent
and drought crop sales increased by an estimated
620 per cent (from a very small base since these crops
were hardly comrnercialised prior to their incor-
poration into official marketing channels);7
7i figure obviously exaggerates the growth of drought crop sales
due to lack of information on their traded quantities prior to official
purchases. The basis of the figure is given in Ellis [1982a].
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the total volume of peasant output marketed
through official channels stagnated during the 1970s.8
This was in spite of the immense non-price attention
lavished on the rural sector in the form not only of the
state interventions described above but also of
numerous externally-funded production projects
covering a wide range of smallholder crops;
the steep overall decline of real producer prices
between 1970 and 1980 implied substantial resource
transfers from peasant crop producers to the state
(within which are included the parastatal crop
authorities). One approach to the estimation of such
transfers is to examine the comparative trends
between producer prices and sales prices with a view to
calculating the increase in resources absorbed in the
gross marketing margin [Ellis forthcoming. This
exercise reveals that for 14 major crops marketed
through official channels real producer prices declined
by 31 per cent9 while real sales prices increased by
12 per cent. A consequence of these divergent treads
between producer and sales prices was a phenomenal
increase in the real unit gross marketing margin,
estimated at 127 per cent over the observation period;
when these price trend relationships are converted
into the financial flows with which they are associated
it is found that producers received T.Shs 4.6 bn less
(aggregated over the 11-year period in money terms)
than they would have received if producer prices had
risen in line with the sales prices of marketed crop
output. Of this total amount T.Shs 2.2 bn was
accounted for by increased export and sales taxes and
T.Shs 2.4 bn corresponded to additional resources
absorbed by the crop parastatals;
if the total estimated resource transfer is
expressed as a percentage tax on the aggregate income
which would have accrued to growers in the absence of
the deterioration in their relative position, it yields an
implicit average tax of 26.6 per cent at the grower level.
This is additional to pre-existing levels of formal
taxation on marketed agricultural production;
an examination of the destination of the
additional resources which accrued to the crop
parastatals reveals that this is one area where the
notion of surplus extraction from peasants to support
a parasitic bureaucracy appears rather accurate. By
far the predominant cause of increased resource
peasant output in 1979-80, at 733,000 tons, was actually lower
than that in 1970-71 (770,000 tons) despite the inclusion in the
former figure of numerous crops which had previously not been
subject to official purchases and thus do not appear in the
computation of earlier marketed supply. Of course aggregate
physical output is a fairly crude approximation of trends since it is
influenced by shifts in composition between high bulk and low bulk
commodities.
9i figure differs from that given in paragraph a) above because it
is based on fewer crops (14 rather than 19), a slightly different
deflator, and a different weighting procedure. These differences are
fully explained in Ellis [forthcoming].
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absorption in crop marketing was a phenomenal
increase in the administrative overheads of crop
parastatals, mainly consisting of their annual wage bill
for permament staff. It is also not entirely irrelevant
here that by December 1980 the crop parastatals had
between them accumulated outstanding bank over-
drafts T.Shs 5 bn, equivalent to nearly three times the
total farm-gate value of their purchases from growers
in that year.
The magnitude of the real producer price declines
given above has been disputed on the grounds that the
deflators used exaggerate the rise in the cost of living
confronting peasants because they include items
which peasants grow for their own consumption.11 It is
the view of the author that it is totally misleading to
argue that because peasants are able, if necessary, to
exist largely outside the monetary economy their cost
of living should exclude items they produce for
themselves. Rather, the subsistence consumption of
peasants should be valued at the price at which it could
otherwise have been obtained in the monetary
economy since this crucially determines the extent to
which peasants are able to participate in exchange and
hence widen their consumption alternatives. To
suggest, for example, that the cost of living
confronting peasant maize growers should exclude
retail food prices is to suggest quite erroneously that
food price movements have no impact on their living
standards. On the contrary, an increase in retail food
prices compared to the producer price of maize would
have the double impact both of reducing the quantity
of alternative foods which could be purchased for a
given quantity of maize and (if the retail maize price
also moved up unfavourably) of reducing the amount
of maize itself which could be purchased back in the
event of shortages later in the season. Both effects have
a negative impact on the material conditions of the
maize grower since they curtail the scope for more
diversified consumption (including a more diverse and
healthier diet) and push the grower back to the level of
pure subsistence.
One further point on the above results is to re-iterate
that their coverage is restricted to marketed crop sales,
and within that to crop sales through state marketing
channels. Hence their specific focus is on price
indicative example is the case of a branch procurement office of
the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania which employed a total of 25
permanent personnel to supervise the production and one annual
collection of 13 tons of tobacco. A study of TAT management
structure provoked this comment in a government report: 'when
one looks at the proportion of employees in each department one
wonders whether the main aim to TAT is seen as the production and
marketing of tobacco or as providing employment for admini-
strators' [United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture,
Marketing Development Bureau, 1980, Annex 11, p 34].
li These deflators are a slightly modified version of the National
Consumer Price Index (NCPI) in Ellis [l982a] and the full NCPI in
Ellis [forthcoming].
relationships and resource flows within the institutional
apparatus established by the state itself to regulate
exchange with the peasant economy. The analysis does
not pretend any conclusions about the extent to which
evasion of formal marketing channels was important
in Tanzania during the 1970s, nor about the evolution
of non-marketed production, nor about the signi-
ficance of marketed crops not subject to formal
marketing procedures. The evidence on all such
aspects is weak and highly conjectural.'2
Some Implications of the Tanzanian
Experience
It appears quite unequivocal that agricultural price
policy has played a major negative role in the evolution
of state policy towards the peasantry. This is most
coherently approached via a properly dynamic
interpretation of the interaction between price and
production policies. The formal adoption of ujamaa in
1967 was followed soon after by a prolonged period of
steeply declining agricultural producer prices fixed by
the state itself. This starved the peasant economy of
any economic basis for expansion at precisely the
point when peasants were being exhorted to abandon
their traditional agricultural practices and experiment
with collective farming. It also generated the negative
cycle already described: namely, the adoption by the
state of a progressively more autocratic approach to
the peasantry in order to try and counteract the
absence of any other incentive for peasant compliance
with state demands. Moreover, an additional factor
was always immanent in this process: that the growth
of bureaucratic institutions would itself require ever
more resources to sustain their expansion and that a
large proportion of such resources would need to be
extracted from peasant agriculture. Hence the
enormous proliferation of bureaucrats in parastatal
marketing institutions was financed by the peasantry
in the form of declining real prices as was also an
increasing proportion of central state tax revenue.
There are two conceptually distinct but mutually
reinforcing processes here: on the one hand, low
agricultural prices causing lack of dynamism in the
rural economy and leading to the use by the state of
extra-economic coercion to force marketed surplus
from the peasant economy; on the other, the
proliferation of state agencies requiring more
intensive surplus appropriation from the peasantry.
This interpretation of Tanzanian events obviously
differs from those based either in a vision of the state
as the neutral vehicle for the transmission of socialist
ideals, or in a view of the peasantry as an unresponsive
Some of these weaknesses are dealt with more fully in Ellis [forth-
coming].
(and, by default, unmotivated and obstinate) force
which requires to be dragged unwillingly into a social
process of someone else's devising. It is difficult,
however, to see how such views can be sustained in the
face of the evidence. The structure of the Tanzanian
economy of itself dictated that the immense growth of
the state could only be sustained by squeezing the
peasants, and the unresponsiveness of the peasantry is
disproved by a wealth of empirical evidence. The
proposition advanced at length by Hyden [1980] that
the only way forward is for the state to 'capture' the
peasantry lies exposed as a sophistry.
It would be incorrect to generalise the Tanzanian
experience too far. Other experiments in rural
transformation have quite different roots both
historically and politically, and must to a great extent
be examined on their particular merits. Nevertheless
there are some lessons to be learnt from Tanzania in
the specific area of agricultural pricing.
First, that the level of agricultural prices and their
general trend cannot simply be ignored when major
organisational changes are being effected in the
peasant economy. To do so is to invite a serious
distortion of peasants' willingness to entertain new
ideas, since the lack of motivation induced by a
squeeze on peasant incomes is all too readily
misinterpreted as a general inertia which in fact only
exists in the minds of those in authority. Secondly, the
impact of domestic inflation on the real level of returns
to agricultural production cannot be ignored. At least
part of the Tanzanian problem was an almost total
failure to realise that money producer price increases
are in themselves no guide to agricultural returns
unless the prices of commodities purchased by
peasants are taken into account. This problem
becomès particularly acute in a state-run economy
since industrial prices are typically self-adjusting
(managers of state industries prices their output on a
cost plus basis) while agricultural prices are not.
Thirdly, it cannot be assumed that peasants (either
individually or collectively) are insensitive to relative
price changes between crops. The Tanzanian
experience strongly indicates the very contrary. A
cautious approach to changes in price relativities is
indicated so that the impact of shifts can be gauged
before enormous quantum jumps are effected in a
particular direction. Fourthly, if it is decided for long
run strategic reasons to turn the terms of trade against
agriculture, this is a process which needs very careful
control. There is no point whatsoever in provoking a
rapid and massive impoverishment of the rural
economy if the surplus generated is simply absorbed in
the recurrent expenditures of state or parastatal
institutions. A controlled decline of the agricultural
terms of trade linked to the specific designation of
surplus for industrial investment might well have a
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role in socialist strategy, but this is certainly not the
way it happened in Tanzania.
Conclusion
In extending the scope of this article to include not
only price policy but the entire cycle of peasant-state
relations in Tanzania, there is a risk that the sweep is
too broad. However, agricultural producer price
policy cannot satisfactorily be examined in isolation
from the wider political and economic processes
within which it is embedded. More than anything else
the Tanzanian case shows that a socialist agriculture
cannot be built on rhetoric and structural engineering
alone. It also requires a substantive economic basis
which allows the advantages of collective action to be
concretely experienced by the participants in such
action. Clearly this cannot be achieved by immiserising
the peasant economy in the precise phase in which
collective farming is first taking root.
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